Casualties among crews were high, but the front-mounted engine augmented crew protection, and probably influenced later Israeli tank design.
In the critical battle of Abu-Ageila the Israeli 38th Armored Division with about 150 AMX13s, M50s, and Centurions outnumbered and outmatched the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division supported by only 90 old T-34/85 tanks and 20 SU-100 tank destroyers.
In all, the Israelis deployed about 70,000 men and 700 tanks, the Egyptians about 900 tanks and 100,000 men. On the main southern front the Israelis massed six armored, three parachute, one infantry and one mechanized infantry brigades, to face four armored, two infantry, and one mechanized infantry divisions of the Egyptian Army. Tal was a primary architect of the surprise attack known as the 1967 Six Day War. This granted Israeli tank gunners, trained to fight at ranges up to 1,500 meters, an enormous advantage in a defensive battle. Tactically, tank crews were trained to advance in a rapid rush to within about a half-kilometer of the enemy before opening fire. The result was a war of low-intensity attrition that continues to the present day.Įgyptian and Syrian armor doctrine imitated that of the Soviets: overwhelming numbers and acceptance of massive losses in pursuit of a clear strategic goal, the elimination of Israel. Tactical success led to conquest of additional territory that Israel would never be able to completely control, and consumed manpower to defend successively extended borders. As a practical matter, Tal’s doctrine would of necessity be aggressive yet strictly tactical in scope, and this led Israel into a strategic trap. Tal’s armor-heavy doctrine, with emphasis on preservation of Israel’s limited military manpower, held considerable appeal to Israel’s politicians. His doctrine was based upon a triad of mobility, relentless attacks, and exploiting the greater striking range of Western-supplied tanks. In 1964 Tal assumed command of Israeli armored forces, and set about making it into the centerpiece of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Israel Tal had served in the Jewish Brigade of the British Army in World War II, and as a junior officer in the War of Independence. AMX13s and Centurions remained part of the mix. The Israelis had also upgraded many old M4 tanks to their M50 and M51 “Super Shermans,” with a 105-mm main gun. Israel was far better equipped, with about 250 American-built M48 and M48A1 tanks, many upgraded with the 105-mm L7 main gun used in the Centurion. The Jordanian Army was equipped with American M47, M48, and M48A1 tanks. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were equipped with a mix of Soviet T-34/85, T-54, T-55, and PT-76 tanks, the newest Soviet T-62s, and self-propelled guns. A pattern had been set for heavy Israeli reliance upon armored and airborne forces.īy 1967 both sides were armed to the teeth as part of a sort of proxy war.
#Israeli tank force field full#
In this short and undeclared war the AMX13 was unable to test its full potential. With Russia threatening direct military support to the Egyptians and the Americans condemning the “expedition,” the Franco-British troops were forced to withdraw, ending the shortest war in history. As the major powers increasingly aligned themselves with local powers, the stage was set for a confrontation between the equipment if not the armored doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union. The attack came as a complete surprise, advancing into the Sinai.
Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula in an operation heavily influenced by the old blitzkrieg model. On November 6, a squadron of AMX-13s from the 2e Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie disembarked at Port Fouad and Port Saïd to reinforce airborne forces. French and British petroleum tankers were the most affected, prompting both nations to intervene militarily. In November 1956, Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to restrict access to the Suez Canal. By 1955, France was selling weapons to Israel, including M4s and later AMX13 light tanks. Tanks played little role in the 1948–49 War of Independence.Įager to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union cultivated relations with Egypt, and supplied about 230 T-34/85 and IS-3M tanks, seriously skewing the balance of power. The Lebanese were stuck with venerable French FTs. The Syrians had French H35 and H39 tanks.
Egypt had a mixed bag of American M4s and M22 Locust light tanks, British Crusaders and Matildas, and even 1930s vintage British Mark VI light tanks. The newly created Arab states were arming themselves with whatever surplus weapons could be procured on the black market or were abandoned in place by the colonial powers. Long before the partition of Palestine, Israeli agents began the covert purchase of heavy weapons including ten old French R39 light tanks. Following World War II the opposing Arab and Israeli armies were among the primary practitioners of armored warfare, largely because the terrain and conditions were so suitable.